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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
tie (if anything) to the Executive's ability to influence the dismissal of
cases involving foreign sovereigns.
7 6
Instead of straying beyond the facts of the case and reviving the
process of executive suggestion in immunity determinations, the Alt-
mann Court should have confined its opinion strictly to the retroactiv-
ity of the FSIA. Such an approach, although leaving unresolved the
academic tension between sovereign immunity principles and practice,
would have yielded far better practical results by preserving ample
opportunity for the Executive to exercise its political clout while steer-
ing clear of the uncertainty and troublesome constitutional questions
the Altmann Court has injected into sovereign immunity doctrine.
E. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act
Foreign Antitrust Liability. - After much deliberation, the World
Trade Organization has added antitrust cooperation to the list of issues
to be negotiated in the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks.' This
development reflects the realization that increasing economic interde-
pendence creates opportunities for a multinational corporation to harm
consumers from beyond a nation's borders, often with the tacit ap-
proval of that corporation's home country.' The United States has
long been aware of this phenomenon; since Judge Learned Hand
penned United States v. Aluminum Co. of America3 (Alcoa) in 1945,
U.S. courts have routinely extended the Sherman Act beyond our
shores to encompass anticompetitive behavior abroad that affects
prices in the American market. 4 Last Term, in F. Hoffman-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 5 the Supreme Court reined in this practice by
placing substantial limits on the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach.
The Court's elevation of comity over consumer protection was a dra-
matic departure from previous antitrust cases and failed to appreciate
the value of the Sherman Act's deterrent effect in an era of increasing
globalization.
76 This is particularly so considering the Court's reluctance to describe how much deference
should be given to the Executive's immunity suggestions. See supra note 70.
1 See Edward T. Swaine, Against Principled Antitrust, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 959, 959-6o (2003).
2 See, e.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified
in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 30 U.S.C.) (exempting from U.S. antitrust prosecution compa-
nies whose anticompetitive activities harm only foreign markets); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cali-
fornia, 509 U.S. 764, 779 (1993) (holding that British reinsurance agencies violated the Sherman
Act through anticompetitive activities that were legal in the United Kingdom).
3 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4 See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 779; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976).
5 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
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At issue in Empagran was the meaning of a single article - "a" -
in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 19826 (FTAIA).
The FTAIA, an unnecessarily complicated statute that "has been
charitably described as 'cumbersome and inelegant," 7 generally ex-
cludes from the Sherman Act any anticompetitive behavior arising
from foreign trade.8 It does, however, contain a two-pronged excep-
tion to this exclusion: foreign trade is actionable under the Sherman
Act if that trade has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on U.S. trade or commerce 9 and if the effect would give rise to
"a claim" under the Sherman Act. 10 How courts should interpret the
phrase "a claim" would determine whether the FTAIA permits foreign
plaintiffs to sue foreign defendants in a U.S. court for anticompetitive
behavior that injured the plaintiffs abroad but also affected U.S.
commerce. The plaintiffs, a consortium of foreign and domestic con-
sumers, alleged that the defendants comprised a worldwide cartel to
fix the price of vitamins in violation of the Sherman Act. 1 The de-
fendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the FTAIA denied sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim because the alleged
injury took place outside U.S. territory. 12 The plaintiffs contended
that Congress's use of "a claim" rather than "the claim" in the FTAIA
permitted them to sue for anticompetitive injury suffered abroad, as
long as the injury stemmed from conduct that also affected U.S. com-
merce. 13 The district court disagreed, finding that "the effect provid-
ing the jurisdictional nexus must also be the basis for the injury al-
leged under the antitrust laws.' 14
6 I5 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
7 Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transac-
tions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2 15 i,
2157 (2003) (quoting iA PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 272 (2d
ed. 2ooo)). Another commentator states that the FTAIA is "not destined for inclusion in a manual
of style." Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 288 (2002) (quoting MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1197 (4 th ed. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
9 Id. § 6a(i).
10 Id. § 6a(2).
11 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., Civ. No. oo-1686, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2o9io, at *3 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001).
12 Id. at *4-5.
13 See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F3d 338, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
14 Empagran, 2oo U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2o9Io, at *7; see also id. at *13. The district court dis-
missed only the foreign plaintiffs, because the domestic plaintiffs' injuries could be actionable de-
spite being suffered abroad if the plaintiffs could prove they had purchased their vitamins in in-
terstate commerce. See id. at *13. The domestic plaintiffs later transferred their claims to
another pending case and settled, while the foreign plaintiffs appealed. See Empagran, 315 F.3 d
at 343-
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The D.C. Circuit reversed, seeking a middle ground between the
two then-existing interpretations of the FTAIA.15 The Fifth Circuit
had previously held that the second prong of the FTAIA exception re-
quired the effect on U.S. markets to give rise to "the antitrust claim" at
issue. 16 In contrast, the Second Circuit had recognized the deterrence
value of allowing foreign plaintiffs to punish companies that violated
the Sherman Act, and therefore interpreted the FTAIA to make ac-
tionable any conduct whose domestic effects violated the Sherman
Act." The D.C. Circuit explained that it found the Fifth Circuit's test
"overly rigid" and that the Second Circuit's test "seem[ed] to reach too
far" in the other direction.' 8 After determining that the plain language
of the statute "does not clearly resolve the question whether 'a claim'
means the plaintiff's claim,"' 9 the court looked to legislative history
and to the importance of deterring anticompetitive behavior.20  Al-
though both parties were able to find some support in the legislative
history, the court reasoned that the only way to read the otherwise
conflicting history consistently was to conclude that, "as a whole," it
"support[ed] the less restrictive interpretation of the FTAIA."'2 1
The D.C. Circuit found further guidance in Pfizer Inc. v. Govern-
ment of India.22  In Pfizer, the Supreme Court permitted a foreign
government to seek treble damages for a Sherman Act violation, hold-
ing that "denying a foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation
the right to sue . . . 'would lessen the deterrent effect' of the antitrust
laws."23 Although it recognized that Pfizer differed from the case at
bar, the D.C. Circuit found that deterrence was a persuasive rationale
for permitting the foreign plaintiffs to sue.2 4 Unlike the Second Cir-
cuit, however, the D.C. Circuit was unwilling to permit foreign plain-
tiffs to sue for just any Sherman Act violation. Instead, the court de-
termined, subject matter jurisdiction exists only if "[t]he anti-
competitive conduct itself [violates] the Sherman Act and the conduct's
harmful effect on United States commerce [gives] rise to 'a claim' by
someone, even if not the foreign plaintiff who is before the court. '25
15 See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 341.
16 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF, 241 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2001).
17 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3 d 384, 390, 403 (2d Cir. 2002).
18 Empagran, 315 F.3 d at 341.
19 Id. at 349.
20 See id. at 350.
21 Id. at 352.
22 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
23 Empagran, 315 F.3 d at 355 (quoting Pfizer., 434 U.S. at 315).
24 See id. at 356.
25 Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court reversed.16  Writing for the Court, Justice
Breyer first resolved the threshold issue of whether the FTAIA's blan-
ket exclusion applies only to export commerce (American goods pro-
duced for sale abroad) and not to import commerce (such as that at is-
sue in Empagran)17 The Court quickly debunked this myth, noting
that "the FTAIA originated in a bill that initially referred only to 'ex-
port trade or export commerce' 28 but that, according to the House
Report, the language was changed "deliberately to include commerce
that did not involve American exports but which was wholly for-
eign."29
After finding that the FTAIA exempts import commerce in general
from Sherman Act jurisdiction, the Court then determined whether the
FTAIA exception resurrected the plaintiffs' claim. 30 In deciding that it
did not, the Court relied heavily on the notion that it "ordinarily con-
strues ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations. 31  This rule, Justice Breyer
wrote, reflects customary international law, which "(we must assume)
Congress ordinarily seeks to follow. '32 Courts must recognize, the ma-
jority reasoned, that "in today's highly interdependent commercial
world," this rule assumes that legislators "take account of the legiti-
mate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American
laws" so as to achieve international legal harmony.33 The Court ac-
knowledged that in previous cases comity had taken a backseat to
Congress's desire "to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct [had] caused. 34  But when the conduct
"causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives
rise to the plaintiff's claim," the justification for interference with an-
other nation's sovereignty "seems insubstantial. 35 The FTAIA's pur-
pose was to release from Sherman Act prosecution any conduct caus-
ing foreign harm,36 and while there is an exception if that conduct also
causes domestic harm, "any independent domestic harm the foreign
conduct causes here has, by definition, little or nothing to do with the
matter. "3
26 Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2363.
27 See id. at 2365-66. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer. Justice O'Connor took no part in the case.
28 Id. at 2365 (quoting H.R. 5235, 9 7 th Cong. § i (i981)).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 2366.
31 ld.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2367 (emphasis omitted).
36 See id.
37 Id.
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Justice Breyer also cited the amicus briefs of foreign governments,
which argued that applying U.S. antitrust remedies - particularly the
granting of treble damages - would unjustifiably upset the balance of
policy interests those countries had achieved in determining their own
antitrust schemes. 38 While plaintiffs asserted that courts could account
for comity considerations on a case-by-case basis, the majority rejected
this approach as "too complex to prove workable."3 9 Overall, the
Court held that it must assume Congress meant to respect the legisla-
tive processes of other nations and that, "if America's antitrust policies
could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such
ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose
them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat. 40
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the FTAIA's language and
legislative history indicate Congress sought either to clarify or to limit
the scope of the Sherman Act, not to expand it.4 1 The Court found no
indication that, prior to enactment of the FTAIA, the Sherman Act
had permitted foreign plaintiffs to sue for foreign harm in U.S. courts
when the same conduct created domestic harm as well.4 2 In fact, the
Court cited Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,43 "a leading
contemporaneous lower court case," for the notion that the domestic
effect had to be "sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the
plaintiffs. 44
Justice Scalia filed a short opinion concurring in the judgment,
which Justice Thomas joined.4 Justice Scalia concurred because "the
language of the statute is readily susceptible of the interpretation the
Court provides and because only that interpretation is consistent with
the principle that statutes should be read in accord with the customary
deference to the application of foreign countries' laws within their own
territories. '46
At first glance, Empagran's reliance on comity seems to fit within
the jurisprudence of an increasingly cosmopolitan Court. But the in-
ternational flavor of the decision masks the dissonance between this
case and previous antitrust opinions. Since the 1940s, the Court has
38 See id. at 2368. Several countries, including Germany, Canada, and Japan, submitted
amicus briefs. See id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 236o.
41 Id.
42 Id. The Court distinguished six cases that respondents offered to support their argument; in
three cases, the plaintiff was the United States, which is not subject to FTAIA restrictions, while
the other three did not involve independently caused foreign injuries. See id. at 2369-71.
43 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
44 Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Timberkane, 549 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added)).
45 Id. at 2373 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
46 Id.
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not wavered from the belief that the congressional intent underlying
the Sherman Act was to protect American consumers from the ill ef-
fects of anticompetitive behavior, regardless of formalities such as the
defendant's nationality or the location of the conduct at issue.4 7 In re-
versing this trend, the Court's overly formalistic distinction between
foreign and domestic plaintiffs added an unnecessary layer of protec-
tion for foreign governments, while decreasing the deterrence value of
the Sherman Act and hindering its goal of protecting the American
public.
Empagran's substantial deference to the legislative processes of for-
eign countries marks a sea change in antitrust jurisprudence. Begin-
ning with Justice Learned Hand's famous Alcoa decision,4 8 extraterri-
torial application of the Sherman Act has turned almost exclusively on
the effects of the foreign conduct on domestic commerce; comity has
functioned primarily as a tool of the dissent. The reigning test before
Alcoa, established in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,4 9 had
confined the Sherman Act to conduct occurring on U.S. territory
50
Recognizing the growing effect of foreign conduct on domestic mar-
kets, Alcoa eschewed this test and instead permitted a Sherman Act
claim if the conduct in question "intended to affect imports [into the
United States] and did affect them."'1  Many courts promulgated a
version of the Alcoa test, narrowing the extraterritoriality debate to the
definitions of "intent" and "effects. '52 Concerned about the interests of
foreign states - interests unrepresented in these cases - the Ninth
Circuit in Timberlane added a comity-based balancing test to the do-
mestic effects test when assessing whether subject matter jurisdiction
extended to the foreign conduct in question. 53 In an era of growing in-
ternational friction regarding the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act,54 Timberlane opened the door for courts to rein in
American antitrust law.
But although the Restatement endorsed the Timberlane test,5 5 the
Supreme Court did not. In the 1993 case Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
47 See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-15 (0978).
48 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
49 213 U.S. 347 (,909).
50 See id. at 355-58.
51 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
52 See Cavanagh, supra note 7, at 2154 & n.13.
53 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 E2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. i976).
54 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563,
563-64 (2000).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987); see also
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASON-
ABLENESS 42-43 (i996) (stating that the author, who served as reporter for the Restatement, un-
derstood section 403 to follow the Timberlane approach).
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v. California,5 6 the Court was faced with a situation in which British
reinsurance agencies, acting in London, engaged in conduct that was
legal under British law but violated the Sherman Act through its effect
on U.S. commerce. 57 The British government, in an amicus brief, ap-
pealed to comity in much the same way foreign governments did in
Empagran: the British Parliament had established a "comprehensive
regulatory regime over the London reinsurance market, s58 and an
American decision to ban behavior that Britain permits would upset
the balance of interests inherent in British law.5 9 But the Hartford
Fire majority saw no need to avoid the "legal imperialism[] through
legislative fiat"60 that so troubled the Empagran Court. It asserted
that "concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a court has
determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act ju-
risdiction. '61 Over a vociferous dissent by Justice Scalia highlighting
the importance of comity,62 the majority stated that if foreign conduct
affects domestic commerce, comity warrants dismissal only when
"compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible"
- that is, when foreign law commands the company to do what the
Sherman Act prohibits. 63 Hartford Fire was widely considered to be a
"near death blow" to comity as a factor in antitrust cases, a recognition
that Congress intended to deter anticompetitive behavior that harmed
American consumers, regardless of the source.64
The Empagran Court's resurrection of international comity from its
Hartford Fire deathbed was particularly surprising given the number
of safeguards the D.C. Circuit had already provided to protect foreign
governments' interests. First, the D.C. Circuit's test would permit a
claim only when the plaintiff could show a "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect"65 on U.S. commerce - language that the
FTAIA lifted almost verbatim from traditional comity analysis.66 This
threshold test acts as a tripwire to prevent U.S. courts from interfering
56 509 U.S. 764 ('993).
57 See id. at 798-99.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
61 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797 n.24 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 817-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 Hartford Fire, 5o9 U.S. at 799.
64 See Waller, supra note 54, at 564-65; see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney
General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 219, 234 (2001) (stating that Hartford Fire "essentially eliminated" comity); Mehra, supra
note 7, at 277 (stating that Hartford Fire "virtually eliminated" the use of comity).
65 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 388, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting i5
U.S.C. § 6a (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
66 See Andrew Stanger, Note, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties After
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1481.
[Vol. I118:248
THE SUPREME COURT - LEADING CASES
unreasonably with foreign sovereignty: if the domestic effects are not
direct and substantial, U.S. interest is relatively weak and a court
would decline to find jurisdiction to hear the foreign plaintiff's com-
plaint. By comparison, if there is a direct and substantial effect on the
U.S. market, U.S. interest is strong regardless of the putative plaintiff's
nationality.
If, despite this safeguard, the D.C. Circuit's test were proved to in-
fringe unnecessarily upon foreign sovereignty, foreign legislatures
would still have several tools that could be, and historically have been,
deployed to combat excessive extraterritoriality. For example, when
the United States first began applying the Sherman Act extraterritori-
ally in the 198os, nations such as Britain and Australia countered with
"blocking statutes," which prevented foreign companies from comply-
ing with American discovery requests, and "claw-back statutes," which
allowed foreign companies to recover in foreign courts the judgments
they lost in American antitrust actions. 67  These countermeasures
forced the executive and legislative branches to hammer out bilateral
treaties governing Sherman Act application abroad, 68 which calibrate
the interests of the various countries involved much more precisely
than a judicial panel's guesswork ever could. 69 Given the element of
comity built into the FTAIA, combined with the additional remedies
available to foreign governments to combat American "legal imperial-
ism," the Empagran Court's additional emphasis on protecting foreign
sovereignty over protecting American consumers seems misplaced.
Lurking as the elephant in the courtroom is the potential adminis-
trative burden of the D.C. Circuit's rule, but this concern would ulti-
mately be alleviated by the standing doctrine. Whether the American
"litigation crisis" is real or only perceived,7 0 one can imagine the judi-
ciary's reluctance to permit foreign claimants, lured by broad discov-
ery rules and the possibility of punitive damages, to flood American
courts instead of their own home venues. In theory, the Supreme
Court's denial of subject matter jurisdiction will shift many purely
67 See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 198o (U.K.), reprinted in A.V. LOWE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATER-
IALS 186 (1983).
68 See William Knighton, Britain: Blocking and Claw-Back, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 52, 54-55 (John R. Lacey ed., 1983)
(stating that the "general policy disposition" of the British government was to deal with extraterri-
torial Sherman Act claims through negotiation prior to deploying countermeasures).
69 See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Co-operation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-
Austl., 1369 U.N.T.S. 43 (agreeing that the U.S. would involve the Australian government when
prosecuting Sherman Act claims against Australian corporations in exchange for increased coop-
eration).
70 See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explo-
sion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Com-
mitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
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foreign antitrust claims back to foreign courtrooms and protect U.S.
taxpayers from shouldering the burden of global antitrust enforcement.
But in reality, the formidable doctrine of antitrust standing already
protects U.S. courts from a deluge of Empagran-like cases. Even if
subject matter jurisdiction is found under the FTAIA, a foreign plain-
tiff must still prove that he "is in the best position to sue on the
claim.""1 In the vast majority of cases, then, even a foreign plaintiff
who could show injury from conduct that also injured American con-
sumers would find he lacked standing "to preserve the effectiveness of
the superior plaintiffs."'1
2
Given the doctrine of antitrust standing, Empagran has two pri-
mary effects. First, it prevents foreign plaintiffs from suing when anti-
competitive behavior harms Americans who for some reason lack the
capacity to sue. Second, it prevents foreign victims from joining their
American counterparts in suits to disgorge the ill-gained profits of a
worldwide cartel. These effects undermine the deterrence rationale
that underlies post-Alcoa extraterritorial antitrust actions. One of the
Court's most devastating rhetorical weapons was its claim that the in-
jury for which the plaintiffs sought remedy was "independent" of the
domestic effect of the anticompetitive behavior. 73 But this description
is misleading. Alcoa stands for the proposition that the judiciary
should not allow legal formalism to impede congressional interest in
deterring conduct with anticompetitive effects on U.S. commerce. The
Sherman Act seeks to punish the conduct at issue, not the effects. To
the extent that the same conduct both causes the foreign plaintiff's in-
jury and gives rise to "a claim" in violation of the Sherman Act, a suf-
ficient jurisdictional nexus exists between the conduct and the foreign
plaintiff's claim.' 4  A judgment in such a case would end current
transgressions, deter future violations, and preserve the competitive-
ness of the U.S. market, regardless of the nationality of the named
plaintiff receiving the damage award. Courts should thus interpret an-
titrust law so as to deter as much anticompetitive behavior in the
United States as possible, as long as the administrative costs do not ex-
ceed the benefits of deterrence (a balance preserved by the standing
doctrine). 75
71 Cavanagh, supra note 7, at 2187.
72 Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
73 See Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2363-64, 2366-7I.
74 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents, Empagran, 124 S. Ct.
2359 (No. 03-724), available in 2004 WL 542780, at *9-I4.
75 But see Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1510-24 (1998) (discussing the possibility of global overdeterrence when each nation pursues a
self-interested antitrust policy abroad).
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As the D.C. Circuit noted, previous Supreme Court cases have wel-
comed foreign proxy plaintiffs as an important tool for antitrust deter-
rence. In Pfizer, the Supreme Court granted certain foreigners stand-
ing to sue for antitrust violations alongside their American counter-
parts, because foreign participation enhanced American antitrust law's
goals of compensation and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.7 6 A highly
profitable global cartel may not be sufficiently deterred by the prospect
of paying even punitive damages to its American victims, a point
Judge Higginbotham made when dissenting from the Fifth Circuit's
rigid interpretation of the FTAIA:
A worldwide price-fixing scheme could sustain monopoly prices in the
United States even in the face of such liability if it could cross-subsidize its
American operations with profits from abroad. Unless persons injured by
the conspiracy's effects on foreign commerce could also bring antitrust
suits against the conspiracy, the conspiracy could remain profitable and
undeterred.77
Empagran also increases the government's costs when prosecuting
its own antitrust claims. The Department of Justice, of course, is not
limited by the second prong of the FTAIA test as private plaintiffs are:
the government can prosecute any Sherman Act violation without
identifying an American victim.78 But resource constraints are a sub-
stantial limit on the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. The
D.C. Circuit's rule would have alleviated this problem: expanding
FTAIA jurisdiction widens the scope of potential whistleblowers who
stand to gain from the Sherman Act's punitive damages provisions.
As foreign whistleblowers come forward, the Justice Department can
more easily identify worldwide cartels and gain inexpensive access to
the information required to defeat them. Empagran denies the gov-
ernment access to that treasure trove of information by destroying the
incentive for foreign whistleblowers to come forward, on the ground
that doing so might offend foreign nations' notions of sovereignty.
Empagran asked the basic question: "Why is it reasonable to apply
this law to conduct that is significantly foreign insofar as that conduct
causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives
rise to the plaintiff's claim?"7 9 The majority claimed, "[w]e can find
no good answer to the question."' 0 But the answer is simple. Conduct
is actionable under the FTAIA if it has "direct and substantial" effects
on the American market and if permitting foreign claimants to sue
76 See Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-15 (1978).
77 Den Norske Stats Olieselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF, 241 F.3 d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
78 See 15 U.S.C. §§ I5(a), 45(m) (2000).
79 Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2367 (emphasis omitted).
80 Id.
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both increases the government's ability to defeat existing cartels and
deters new cartels from forming. Existing "effects" tests and the doc-
trine of antitrust standing already rein in excessive extraterritoriality,
provide due deference to foreign sovereignty, and safeguard American
courts from a flood of meritless claims. Given these protections, the
proper question should have been "why is it reasonable to deny juris-
diction under these circumstances?" To the extent that the Court has
placed the interests of foreign governments and its own institutional
concerns above the interests of the American consumer, there is "no
good answer to the question."
F Tax Injunction Act
Constitutional Challenges to State Tax Systems. - The Tax Injunc-
tion Act (TIA or the Act),1 enacted in 1937, states that federal "district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or col-
lection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State. '2 Gradually over the
course of the Act's almost eighty-year history, its scope has been inter-
preted more expansively, diverging from the congressional intent be-
hind it, so that before last Term the TIA had come to stand for the
broad principle that federal courts must not interfere with any aspect
of state tax systems. Last Term, in Hibbs v. Winn,3 the Supreme Court
held that the Act does not bar district courts from hearing constitu-
tional challenges to state tax credits because credits do not fall within
the definition of "assessment," the federal-court review of which is spe-
cifically enjoined by the Act.4 By refusing to interpret the Act as re-
quiring a complete bar to federal jurisdiction over challenges to state
tax systems, the Court has signaled a limit to the gradual expansion of
the Act's scope and has brought it back in line with the more limited
purpose that Congress intended for it.
Underlying this case is a 1997 Arizona statute5 that allows taxpay-
ers to reduce their state tax liability by up to $500 per person by claim-
ing a credit for donations to an Arizona School Tuition Organization
(STO).6 STOs must allocate at least ninety percent of their annual
revenue to scholarships or tuition grants for children attending private
primary or secondary schools that do not discriminate based on race,
color, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.7 Schools re-
1 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
2 Id.
3 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004).
4 See id. at 2282, 2286.
5 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (West 1998).
6 Id. § 43-IO89(A).
7 Id. § 43-io8g(E).
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